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Developing countries, especially those in Sub-Saharan
Africa, rely on a few primary commodities and minerals as
their main sources of revenue and foreign exchange.
Ghana, a typical developing country, has relied on cocoa,
gold, and timber, which together have accounted for more
than 70% of export earnings. There was an urgent need to
diversify Ghana’s export base following the persistent
decline in the prices of cocoa and gold in the 1980s and
1990s. Efforts to diversify the export base resulted in the
promotion of wood, aluminum, marine products, and
horticultural products—referred to as nontraditional
exports (NTE)—along with tourism (ISSER, 2002).
Horticultural products in general and pineapples in
particular have received a lot of support from the World
Bank and the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID; Boselie & Muller, 2002). The
diversification efforts paid off, and pineapple has since
become the most important agricultural NTE. Pineapple
exports have increased from 2,600 metric tons in 1986 to
more than 42,000 metric tons in 2002, earning the nation
over $47 million (FAO, 2004). In addition, pineapple
production has provided employment and income in the
pineapple growing regions. However, the current industry
structure and organization makes it very difficult to realize
the full potential of the industry.
The main focus of this paper is to examine a marketing
arrangement in Ghana—the Farmapine model—that has
the potential of changing the industry structure and offer-
ing a means of realizing some of the potentials in the
industry. Specifically, this paper examines the institutional
arrangement behind the establishment of Farmapine and
the inherent efficiencies in the model over existing
arrangements. Secondly, this paper seeks to identify and
discuss factors that will impact replication of the model by
other producer groups in Ghana and other developing
countries. To achieve the objectives of this study, 60 small-
scale pineapple producers were surveyed, and information
on their production and marketing activities was collected
via questionnaires. Thirty of the small-scale producers
were selected from the 172-member Farmapine coopera-
tives. The remaining thirty were selected from among the
hundreds of noncooperative small-scale producers. In
addition, twelve exporters were surveyed for information
on their export and marketing activities. The twelve
exporters were selected from the 16-member Sea-Freight
Pineapple Exporters of Ghana (SPEG), an umbrella orga-
nization for exporters. This organization is responsible for
over 90% of all pineapple exports from Ghana.
Pineapple Industry in Ghana
The pineapple industry in Ghana is composed of produc-
ers and exporters. There are three categories of producers:
large, medium, and small-scale. Large-scale producers are
producers with more than 100 acres of pineapple under
active cultivation. Medium-scale producers have 50–100
acres under cultivation. Small-scale producers (also known
as outgrowers) have less than 50 acres under cultivation.
The majority, however, have less than ten acres under cul-
tivation. Most of the large-scale and some of the medium-
scale producers also operate as pineapple exporters, export-
ing their fruits mainly to Europe. Exporters buy approxi-
mately 40% of their export requirements from outgrowers82 CHOICES 1st Quarter 2005 • 20(1)
under various arrangements. These
arrangements are seldom character-
ized by formal contracts. An exporter
may provide assistance—often in the
form of chemicals, planting materi-
als, or even cash advances—to an
outgrower with the understanding
that the outgrower sells his produce
to the exporter. In most cases, out-
growers receive no assistance from
the exporter. Exporters usually
approach outgrowers when they need
fruits to meet an export order,
whereas outgrowers only contact
exporters when their fruits mature.
Most of the producer/exporters
usually try to produce the bulk of
exportable fruits from their own
farms, taking on all the production
and marketing risks. This requires
huge investments in land and equip-
ment. They also face severe credit
constraints, as they find it very diffi-
cult getting approved for loans
(Obeng, 1994). The result is that
they end up not being able to pro-
duce all the fruits needed for export.
Thus, exporters are forced to rely on
outgrowers. However, in the absence
of formal contracts, outgrowers can
be unreliable, often reneging on prior
agreements and selling to other
exporters offering higher prices. This
scenario makes it difficult for export-
ers to enter into long-term contracts
with their European importers. In
addition, the quality of outgrowers’
fruits cannot always be guaranteed, as
exporters have no knowledge of the
agronomic and cultural practices to
which the fruits are subjected.
Outgrowers, on the other hand,
also take all the production and mar-
keting risks in their operations. Dur-
ing periods of high demand that
occur during the winter months, out-
growers are assured of a ready market
for their produce. At these times,
exporters try to outbid each other for
the outgrowers’ fruits. However,
w h e n  E u r o p e a n  d o m e s t i c  f r u i t s
become available in summer (espe-
cially June and July), outgrowers find
it very difficult to sell their fruits
(Obeng, 1994). During such times,
some exporters would not honor
prior agreements made to buy fruits
from outgrowers. In some cases,
exporters abscond after taking deliv-
ery of fruits. Outgrowers also have
had to contend with delayed pay-
ments—sometimes as late as six
months after fruits have been deliv-
ered. Given the above arrangements,
neither the exporters nor the out-
growers were satisfied.
The Farmapine Arrangement
The Farmapine cooperatives were
formed as a result of the unsatisfac-
tory arrangements between outgrow-
ers and exporters. According to the
cooperative members, the coopera-
tives were formed to enhance their
ability to attract help in producing
and marketing their produce. Tech-
noserve, a US-based development
agency, has been assisting the cooper-
ative members to improve their pro-
duction and management practices
(Boselie & Muller, 2002). The coop-
erative members, however, were still
constrained by the lack of a reliable
market source and lack of access to
credit. The prevailing industry struc-
ture, coupled with their small sizes,
made them helpless in overcoming
these constraints. Stanton (2000) has
identified small sizes as the underly-
ing factor in most of the challenges
rural producers face, and suggests the
formation of cooperatives as one way
of overcoming this problem.
In 1999, the World Bank, under
its agricultural diversification pro-
gram, provided $1.4 million for the
formation of Farmapine Ghana Lim-
ited (FGL). The money was to be
repaid in 10 years at a 7% interest
rate. FGL is a marketing concern that
processes and exports the farmers’
produce. It is owned by members of
five farmers’ cooperatives and two
former producers/exporters. The five
cooperatives have 80% ownership;
the former exporters hold the
remaining 20%. Once the World
Bank loan is repaid, the cooperative
members will be able to share in any
profits resulting from operations.
The cooperative members sell their
fruits to FGL for processing and
export. The whole arrangement is
guided by formal contracts signed
between FGL, the cooperatives, and
cooperative members. Membership
in these cooperatives was initially
open to all pineapple producers.
Once FGL was formed, new mem-
bers were no longer accepted.
Pineapple was selected for sup-
port due to the following reasons. It
is an exportable crop with a ready
market in Europe and has a relatively
shorter gestation period. Moreover,
the farmers’ cooperatives were already
formed and active. The limiting fac-
tors were access to the European mar-
ket in the form of reliable importers
or buyers and in-depth knowledge of
the export market. To overcome this,
the two former exporters were
included as shareholders in the FGL
arrangement. Farmapine was incor-
porated in March 1999 and com-
menced operations in September
1999. A managing director hired by
the board of directors oversees day-
to-day operations, assisted by three
production managers and an export
manager. The board is made up of
the presidents of the five farmers’
cooperatives, the two former export-
ers, the managing director, and a rep-
resentative from Technoserve.
The cooperative members receive
chemical inputs on credit from FGL,
which is repaid when their fruits are
harvested. This significantly reduces1st Quarter 2005 • 20(1) CHOICES 83
their financing needs, as the cost of
chemicals constitute the single largest
variable-cost item in pineapple pro-
duction. The cooperative members
do not receive any other credit facili-
ties. Output price is negotiated at the
beginning of the growing season and
reviewed periodically to reflect pre-
vailing prices in the industry. More
importantly, the price is indexed to
the US dollar, and payment takes
place approximately 2–5 weeks after
harvest. Indexing the price to the
dollar offers protection against depre-
ciation in the local currency. This
arrangement guarantees payment to
the cooperatives’ members once fruits
are supplied to FGL.
Additionally, the cooperative
members receive technical advice
from the production managers at
FGL. The production managers act
as extension officers or field special-
ists and assist the farmers with any
challenges they face in production.
They coordinate the planting  and
harvesting activities of the farmers to
ensure that they fit into the overall
export program of FGL. They also
advise and monitor the level of
chemical usage by the farmers to
ensure that they conform to export
standards. Farmers affiliated with
FGL still have to bear the production
risk. However, this risk is reduced
considerably due to the advice, inter-
action, and monitoring of their farm-
ing activities by the FGL field
specialists.
Farmapine, on the other hand, is
assured of quality fruits to meet its
export obligations. It is able to nego-
tiate favorable prices for its exports,
based on its ability to provide a
steady and reliable supply of quality
fruits. Although FGL takes on all the
price risk, it is able to sign contracts
with importers and thus transfer the
price risk to the importer. 
As mentioned previously, Far-
mapine supplies chemical inputs to
the cooperative farmers on credit. In
order to do this, Farmapine usually
requires financing from banks and
other funding sources. Financing is a
constraint for individual cooperative
members, but because Farmapine is a
larger entity with professional man-
agement, it is able to obtain financ-
ing from institutions at more
favorable terms. Additionally, it is
able to buy larger quantities of chem-
icals at significant discounts.
Performance of Farmapine
Farmapine has been profitable since
its inception in 2000 and is the sec-
ond largest exporter of pineapples
from Ghana. In 2003, Farmapine
exported 4,854 mt of pineapples val-
ued at $1.52 million. Cooperative
members are able to consistently
achieve exportable yields of 65% or
more from their fields, which trans-
lates to guaranteed profits of about
$1,000 per acre.1 On average, coop-
erative members cultivate five acres,
and thus earn about $5,000 per
growing season. This amount is sig-
nificant when compared to Ghana’s
per-capita gross national income of
$320 (World Bank, 2004a). Profits
for FGL and the outgrowers are
expected to increase further as
planted acreage and exportable yield
increases.
Outgrowers not affiliated with
FGL achieve lower exportable yields
of 50% or less, translating to profits
of $500 per acre. This profit also car-
ries a greater degree of uncertainty,
whereas profit for the FGL outgrow-
ers is almost given. The non-FGL
outgrowers also face higher variations
in their yield due in part to the lack
of technical support in their opera-
tions and their inability to strictly
adhere to recommended rates when
applying chemicals. The noncooper-
ative farmers have to rely on inade-
quate extension support from the
Ministry of Food and Agriculture
(MOFA). They are also severely con-
strained by the high cost of chemical
inputs, which is further compounded
by the absence of loans or credit of
any kind. This causes them to ration
the quantities of chemicals they apply
on their farms, contributing to the
low yields and the variation in yield.
Both sets of outgrowers sell their
“export rejects” on the local market
for $0.01–0.04/kg compared to the
export price of $0.10/kg.
Total land available for pineapple
cultivation is about the same for both
sets of outgrowers. However, planted
acreage by the cooperative members
is higher on average than that of the
noncooperative members. The coop-
erative members average five acres,
while the noncooperative members
average less than two acres. In addi-
tion, the cooperative members are
very intent on expanding their farms.
This contention is evidenced by the
more than 50% of cooperative mem-
bers who have leased more land or
are in the process of leasing more
land. This clearly indicates that they
are optimistic about the future of
their operations and the pineapple
business in general. The FGL cooper-
ative members are mostly full-time
farmers; farmers not affiliated with
FGL tend to have other occupations.
The cooperative members have on
average two full-time workers and
also employ temporary workers for
land clearing and planting opera-
tions.
Replication of the Model
The apparent success of the Farmap-
ine concept begs the question: How
feasible is it to replicate the model for
other producer groups in Ghana and84 CHOICES 1st Quarter 2005 • 20(1)
in other developing countries? Based
on the working of the Farmapine
model, four important factors have
been identified for successful replica-
tion of the model. The most impor-
tant and fundamental factor is the
existence of cooperatives or organized
farmers’ groups. In the Farmapine
arrangement, the cooperatives were
active and already working with
Technoserve (Boselie & Muller,
2002). This trait contributed to the
successful implementation of the
program. If no entities such as Tech-
noserve exist, extension and develop-
ment specialists could help organize
interested farmers or producers into
viable groups.
In addition to an existing cooper-
ative, funding is critical for the suc-
cessful implementation of any such
program. Funding is needed for any
facility or infrastructure needed to
process and market produce. Small-
scale farmers in developing countries
find it very difficult to get approval
for loans and usually do not have
enough equity of their own. One way
out is for governments to provide
grants or credit guarantees to pro-
ducer groups to establish any such
program. Groups relying on govern-
ments for support would have to
compete for funds with national
development needs such as health
care, basic education, and so forth. A
workable solution would be for the
small-scale producers to join forces
and form cooperatives or producer
groups. These groups can explore
funding sources that would not be
available to the individual members
(Stanton, 2000). The producer
groups can work with development
specialists who can direct them to
viable sources of funding and help
them meet the selection criteria for
funding. A potential source of fund-
ing would be donor agencies that
fund and support a variety of projects
in developing countries. In 2002,
average per-capita aid for the 688
million people in Sub-Saharan Africa
was $28.20 (World Bank, 2004b).
Development specialists have a
larger role in the success of any such
arrangement. They are especially
needed to organize producers into
active cooperatives. These specialists
could work with producers to form
cooperatives where none exist, or
they could help established coopera-
tives to embark on productive ven-
tures. In the Farmapine arrangement,
development specialists from Tech-
noserve contributed significantly to
the establishment of FGL and con-
tinue to support the outgrowers in
managing their operations. Similarly,
development specialists were very
instrumental in the success of New
Generation Cooperatives (NGC)—a
cooperative arrangement prevalent in
North America with structures simi-
lar to the Farmapine model. Fulton
(2001) lists the supporting role of
rural development officers among the
factors that have accounted for the
spread of NGCs in the United States.
Finally, successful implementa-
tion of Farmapine-like arrangements
requires a marketable produce—pref-
erably one with a shorter gestation
period. A healthy demand for any
product reduces the marketing con-
straints and offers the hope of
recouping any investments made.
Pineapple is ideally suited for this
kind of arrangement because of the
huge demand it enjoys in Europe and
its short gestation period (12–14
months). Based on these require-
m e n t s ,  p r o d u c t s  s u c h  a s  p a p a y a ,
yams, cassava (processed into chips or
starch), assorted vegetables, and oth-
ers would also be suitable for such
ventures.
In addition to the factors
described above, an important and
related issue that would impact repli-
cation is the organizational structure
of the group. The current cooperative
structure of Farmapine may not be
an optimal structure for some pro-
ducers. To enhance replication, some
producer groups may find it benefi-
cial to adopt alternative organiza-
tional structures. Fulton (2001)
describes the dynamic nature of
NGCs in adapting to local condi-
tions as a contributing factor to their
success. One popular option that US
producers have been using in form-
ing joint ventures is formation of
Limited Liability Companies (LLC)
(Jorgensen, 2005). An LLC offers
more flexibility in organizing a joint
venture or business activity. Individ-
ual producers could form an LLC as
an alternative structure to engage in
productive activities that add value to
their produce. (A more detailed
description of LLCs and brief
descriptions of other corporate forms
can be found in Meehan-Strub and
Harris, 2004.)
Concluding Remarks
The Farmapine arrangement has
proved more successful than conven-
tional arrangements. Farmapine out-
growers make higher profits and face
lower risks than outgrowers not affili-
ated with FGL. The arrangement has
been successful in increasing farmers’
income, generating employment, and
stemming migration to the cities in
search of jobs. In addition, the coop-
erative members have been active in
their communities, funding the
building of schools and providing
other basic amenities. The Farmapine
model could serve as a sustainable
model for rural development in Sub-
Saharan Africa.
Replication of the Farmapine
model is feasible granted that certain
factors previously described are in
place. The key ingredient needed to1st Quarter 2005 • 20(1) CHOICES 85
bring all the factors together and
enhance replication of the model in
the subregion is government com-
mitment. A committed government
would serve as a facilitator to bring
all the factors together to pave the
way for a successful implementation
of any such program.
Note
1 This is based on average plant pop-
ulation of 20,000/acre, average fruit
weight of 1.5 kg, output price of
$0.10/kg, and a production cost of
$1,000.
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